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Baretz: Combating the Chapter 13 Serial Filer: An Argument for Orders Con

NOTE
COMBATING THE CHAPTER 13 SERIAL FILER:
AN ARGUMENT FOR ORDERS CONTAINING
PROSPECTIVE RELIEF FROM THE AUTOMATIC
STAY PROVISION
I.

INTRODUCTION

Over the past several years, bankruptcy courts have seen the rise of
waivers of the automatic stay provision with increasing frequency. Such
waivers usually purport to grant a creditor relief from the automatic stay
in the event a debtor files for bankruptcy protection in the future. One
setting in which this issue has gained some attention is prepetition waiver
agreements.! These agreements are usually reached when an individual
debtor defaults on a loan obligation to a lender. Rather than immediately
resorting to a foreclosure proceeding, the two parties will typically
attempt to renegotiate or "work-out" the terms of the loan. However,
even a "work-out" on the most favorable of terms can be substantially
altered in the event a borrower files for bankruptcy protection in the
future. Hence, in an attempt to protect their investment from the effects
of bankruptcy, a lender may demand that the borrower agree to waive the
automatic stay imposed by section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code' in any
1. For a general discussion of prepetition waiver agreements and a comprehensive analysis
of the overall importance of waivers to the bankruptcy system in general, see Marshall E. Tracht,
ContractualBankruptcy Waivers: Reconciling Theory, Practice,andLaw, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 301

(1997).
2. Upon the filing of a petition, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) imposes an automatic stay applicable to
(1) the commencement or continuation ...of a judicial, administrative, or other
action or proceeding against the debtor that was or could have been commenced before

[the debtor filed a bankruptcy petition];
(2) the enforcement... of ajudgment obtained before the [filing of the petition

against the debtor];
(3) any act to obtain possession of ...or to exercise control over tthe debtor's
property];
(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the [debtor's]
estate;

(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor ...

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1997

1

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 4 [1997], Art. 6
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[V ol. 25:1315

future bankruptcy case. Courts that have confronted these waiver
3
agreements have disagreed as to their enforceability.
Putting aside the issues surrounding the enforceability of prepetition
waivers of the automatic stay, the other context in which this issue
regularly arises is postpetition, where a debtor previously filed, possibly
several times, for bankruptcy protection. In this setting, a bankruptcy
judge enters a prospective order for relief, forcing a debtor to relinquish
the protections afforded by the automatic stay against a particular creditor
should they again file. This drastic order is intended to combat what has
become an increasingly common problem for bankruptcy courts around
the country: abusive Chapter 13 "serial filers." 4 A "serial filer" is a
debtor who abuses the bankruptcy process by filing successive petitions
after earlier petitions are dismissed, repeatedly using the automatic stay
to forestall creditors.'
Bankruptcy courts have attempted to deal with the problem of serial
filers in two basic ways. One is to dismiss the case and bar a serial filer

secur[ing] a claim that arose before [the debtor filed the petition];
(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that arose
before the commencement of the [bankruptcy] case... ;
(7) the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the commence-

ment of the [bankruptcy] case... ; and
(8) the commencement or continuation of a proceeding before the United States
Tax Court concerning the debtor.
11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1994).
3. See Tracht, supra, note 1, at 311-13, Some courts enforce these agreements, see In re
Hudson Manor Partners, Ltd., No. 91-81065HR, 1991 WL 472592, at *1 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Dec. 31,
1991) (enforcing a contractual waiver of the automatic stay); In re Club Tower L.P., 138 B.R. 307,
312 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1991) (enforcing a prebankruptcy waiver of the automatic stay); In re Citadel
Properties, Inc., 86 B.R. 275, 277 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988) (holding that a prepetition agreement
providing relief from the stay was valid), while others do not, see Commerzanstalt v. Telewide Sys.,
Inc., 790 F.2d 206, 207 (2d Cir. 1986) (stating that "the purpose of the stay is to protect creditors
as well as the debtor"); Farm Credit v. Polk, 160 B.R 870, 873 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1993) (holding
that waiver of the stay is not enforceable because the debtor may not unilaterally waive his protec-

tion against the other creditors); In re Sky Group Int'l, Inc., 108 B.R. 86, 88 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989)
(refusing to give any effect to waivers because enforcement would violate public policy).

4. Although the focus of this Note is the use of orders containing prospective relief from the
automatic stay to guard against the Chapter 13 serial filer, such orders might also be applicable to
prevent serial Chapter 11 filings. This Note, however, will be limited to a discussion of judicial
waiver orders in the context of Chapter 13 cases since the serial filer problem is much more common
in the Chapter 13 context where individuals utilize multiple bankruptcy filings to fend off foreclosing
mortgagees. For a detailed examination of the issues and implications surrounding Chapter 11 serial
filings, see James D. Key, Comment, The Advent of the Serial Chapter 11 Filing and Its
Implications, 8 BANKRL DEv. J.245 (1991).
5. For a more detailed explanation of the automatic stay and of the serial filer problem, see
infra Part II.
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from filing another petition for a certain period of time." A second, less
drastic, solution is an order containing prospective relief from the
automatic stay. Few cases, however, address court orders for prospective
relief from the automatic stay, and those that do only provide a cursory
analysis of the issue.7 The purpose of this Note is to (1) analyze the
sections of the Bankruptcy Code which pertain to judicial orders that
limit a debtor's automatic stay protection in a subsequent bankruptcy
proceeding; (2) address the few cases which discuss prospective orders
for relief from the automatic stay; (3) analyze whether orders for
prospective relief are an appropriate means of combating the serial filer
problem; and (4) discuss the res judicata and collateral estoppel issues
which subsequent courts confront when these orders are granted.
Part II of this Note discusses the automatic stay provision of the
Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 362, and orders which limit the applicability of its protection in a subsequent filing, and several cases which
have denied or upheld orders for prospective relief. Part III discusses
Bankruptcy Code sections 105 and 349(a) and whether these sections
provide a bankruptcy judge with the power to grant orders for prospective relief from the automatic stay. Part IV analyzes why, as a matter of
policy, orders for prospective relief should be enforceable. Part V
discusses the res judicata and collateral estoppel issues which courts
confront when addressing orders for prospective relief.

II.

THE AUTOMATIC STAY AND CASES ADDRESSING
ORDERS FOR PROSPECTIVE RELIEF

A.

11 U.S.C. § 362(a)-The Automatic Stay

Upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition, a debtor is protected by an
automatic stay,' arguably one of the most significant protections
provided by the Bankruptcy Code. The automatic stay serves several

6. For a discussion of the relevance of orders that do not contain language for prospective

relief from the automatic stay, see infra Part III.
7. See Little v. Taylor (In re Taylor), 77 B.R. 237, 240 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1987), aff'd in part
& revd on other grounds, 884 F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1989); In re Keller, Nos. CIV.A. 96-5730,
96-21025/T, 1996 WL 590877, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 10, 1996); Friend v. Chemical Residential
Mortgage Corp. (In re Friend), 191 B.R. 391 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1996); In re Felberman, 196 B.R.
678, 682-83 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995); Brengettcy v. National Mortgage Co. (In re Brengettcy), 177
B.R. 271 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1995); Abdul-Hasan v. Firemen's Fund Mortgage, Inc. (In re AbdulHasan), 104 B.R. 263 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1989); In re Norris, 39 B.R. 85, 86 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984).
8. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(l)-(7) (1994).
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different purposes. First, it provides a "breathing spell" for the debtor by
placing a freeze, for a limited time, on any action taken against the
debtor by his or her creditors.' Second, the automatic stay protects
creditors. The stay ensures an orderly administration of the debtor's
assets and prevents the "feeding frenzy" that would occur without a stay,
whereupon default, creditors would "race to the courthouse" to secure a
lien and execute on the debtor's property. ° Another discernible purpose
of the automatic stay is to simply permit the debtor to "hold on," hoping
for better times." Despite the existence of a policy which might justify
allowing a debtor to forestall his creditors, courts cannot ignore what has
become a major problem in today's bankruptcy courts: the repeated
filings by Chapter'13 debtors designed to fend off the same action by the
same creditor, commonly known as serial filing.
Section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides the means for a
serial filer to misuse the bankruptcy laws. By filing a petition immediately after an earlier petition is dismissed, another stay is "automatically"
imposed pursuant to section 362(a), and Chapter 13 debtors are able to
fend off foreclosing mortgagees, prolong the occupation of their
residences, and frustrate other creditors' rights.
Given the effort and expense invested in foreclosure proceedings,
the hardships caused by serial filers are particularly burdensome on
foreclosing mortgagees. These efforts include issuing a complaint or
petition to foreclose; notifying all interested parties; coordinating the
time, place, and terms of the sale; hiring an officer to conduct the sale;
and advertising the sale. Consider In re Felberman,2 where in March
of 1981, the debtor defaulted on a home mortgage loan from First
National Bank. Seeking to recoup its losses, First National obtained a
judgment of foreclosure in October of 1992 and scheduled a foreclosure
sale for January 19, 1993. On the day of the foreclosure, the debtor filed
a Chapter 13 petition, staying the sale. The debtor's case was dismissed
on June 1, 1993, and First National commenced another foreclosure

9. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a); see also GEORGE M. TREISTER ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF
BANKRUrCY LAW 221 (4th ed. 1996).

10. See Fidelity Mortgage Investors v. Camelia Builders, Inc. (In re Fidelity Mortgage
Investors), 550 F.2d 47, 55 (2d Cir. 1976) (noting that the automatic stay was "designed to prevent

a chaotic and uncontrolled scramble for the debtor's assets in a variety of uncoordinated proceedings
in different courts").
11. See Cashman Inv. Corp. v. Robinson (In re Bradley), 38 B.R. 425,428 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.
1984) ("However primitive as this [objective] may appear on the surface, it is quite clearly an
established policy of bankruptcy law.").

12. 196 B.R. 678 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995).
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proceeding and scheduled another foreclosure sale for August 13, 1993.
Once again, this time the day before the sale, the debtor filed a Chapter
13 petition, staying the sale. On January 13, 1994, the debtor's second
Chapter 13 petition was dismissed, and First National's third foreclosure
sale was scheduled for May 25, 1994. Clearly undeterred by the prior
dismissals, the debtor filed a third Chapter 13 case the day before the
sale, preventing foreclosure once again. One can imagine the frustration
of a mortgagee like First National Bank when a serial filer repeatedly
undercuts their efforts by filing petitions, halting foreclosures, and
forcing the mortgagee to start again from square one.
Dealing with the hardships caused by serial filers has not been easy
for courts. The filing of a bankruptcy petition merely to prevent a
foreclosure proceeding without the ability or intention to reorganize is an
abuse of the Bankruptcy Code and is considered a bad faith filing. 3
However, the challenge that courts have faced is how to stop the abusive
serial filings. While some courts impose sanctions and costs to try to stop
these abusive serial filings, 4 others resort to dismissal of the case on
bad faith grounds. 5 The problem with these measures is that they do
not prevent a serial filer from refiling to trigger the automatic stay and
obstruct another foreclosure. Only a few reported opinions have
attempted to use a prospective order for relief to prevent abusive
refilings,"6 and of those few that are reported, courts have only upheld
such orders in two cases: 7 Abdul-Hasan v. Firemen's Fund Mortgage,
Inc. (In re Abdul-Hasan)5 and In re Felberman.9
B.

The Cases

Very few cases have attempted to use prospective orders for relief
to combat the problem of Chapter 13 serial filing. This section discusses
six of these cases, two of which use a measure akin to an order with

13. See In re Huerta, 137 B.R. 356, 369-70 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1992); In re Trina Assocs., 128
B.RL 858, 872 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1991); see also In re Spectee Group, Inc., 185 B.R. 146, 156
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995) (stating that "[s]erial filings are a 'badge' of bad faith").

14. See In re Bono, 70 B.R. 339, 345 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1987) (ordering sanctions and
awarding costs to prevent attorneys "from becoming partners to such abusive filing").

15. See In re Prud'Homme, 161 B.R. 747, 749 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1993).
16. See supra note 7 and accompanying text; see also In re Keller, Nos. CIV.A. 96-5730,
96-210251T, 1996 WL 590877, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 10, 1996) (an unreported decision upholding an
order containing prospective relief from the automatic stay).

17. See also Keller, 1996 WL 590877, at *1.
18. 104 B.R. 263 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1989).
19. 196 B.R. 678 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995).
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prospective relief called a "drop dead" order."0 Part I returns to the
cases containing "drop dead" orders to illustrate why, as a matter of
policy, orders for prospective relief should be granted.
In what appears to be the first reported case addressing the issuance
of an order for prospective relief, the bankruptcy judge in In re Norris2
granted relief from the automatic stay, permitting a mortgagee to
foreclose. The order for relief stated that "the filing of any future
petitions in bankruptcy [by the debtor] shall not affect the instant Order
granting relief from the [automatic] stay." The debtor's appeal did not
challenge the order for relief except to the extent that it contained
prospective relief which would affect the debtor's rights in future
proceedings.'s The district court refused to uphold the prospective relief,
noting that "[i]n my view, a bankruptcy judge in a pending proceeding
simply does not have the power to determine that the automatic stay shall
not be available in subsequent bankruptcy proceedings."' Norris,
however, was not a serial filing situation, but rather, the order for
prospective relief was granted after the debtor twice failed to show up to
the hearing on the lift stay motion.s
Similarly, in Little v. Taylor (In re Taylor),26 the Ninth Circuit
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel confronted the appeal of a bankruptcy court
default judgment that provided prospective relief from the automatic stay.
Unlike Norris,however, Taylor presented a serial filer situation. After the
debtor's first Chapter 13 petition was dismissed, the debtor filed another
petition, but failed to show up at the lift stay hearing. As a result, the
bankruptcy judge entered an order which lifted the stay and mandated
that the judgment be res judicata in any future bankruptcy proceeding.27
On appeal, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel cited to Norris and vacated

20. See Friend v. Chemical Residential Mortgage Corp. (In re Friend), 191 B.R. 391, 393
(Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1996); Brengettcy v. National Mortgage Co. (In re Brengettcy), 177 B.R. 271,
272 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1995). For an example of a "drop dead" order and a discussion of its
similarity to orders containing prospective relief, see supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
21. 39 B.R. 85 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984).
22. Id. at 86.
23. See id. at 87.
24. Id.
25. See id. at 86.
26. 77 B.R. 237 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1987), affd in part & rev'd on other grounds, 884 F.2d 478
(9th Cir. 1989).
27. The judge's order for default judgment noted "tihat for a period of six months from the
date of entry of the Judgment herein, this relief from automatic stay shall also apply, as res judicata,
to any subsequent Chapter 13 cases and proceedings" and that "this Judgment shall act as a bar
against the automatic stay arising from any further Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceedings." Id. at 239.
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the order, holding that "it is doubtful that a bankruptcy court can enter
such an order."' Interestingly, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel acknowledged that a prior bad faith filing may prevent a debtor from filing
multiple petitions.29 However, the court declined to consider whether the
case under appeal was filed in good faith since the issue was not
addressed in the trial court.30
In contrast, the court in Abdul-Hasan v. Firemen'sFund Mortgage,
Inc. (In re Abdul-Hasan)31 enforced an order for prospective relief
entered in an earlier Chapter 13 case. Again, in Abdul-Hasan, the
bankruptcy judge granted a creditor's motion for relief from the
automatic stay, and the order provided prospective relief.32 Unlike
Norris and Taylor, however, the original order entered by the bankruptcy
court in the debtor's first Chapter 13 case was never appealed and
therefore became final.33 Several months after the order was entered,
and immediately prior to the foreclosure of the debtor's property, the
debtor filed a second Chapter 13 petition without ever trying to modify
the prior order or seek an injunction to prevent the sale of his property.' The creditors relied on the prior order and sold the debtor's
property to a bona fide purchaser at foreclosure.
On appeal, the debtor claimed that the creditors knew of the second
filing and therefore violated the automatic stay by holding the foreclosure
sale. The court addressed whether the order for prospective relief of the
stay in the prior Chapter 13 case relieved the creditor of the requirement
that it again seek relief from the stay when the subsequent bankruptcy
petition was filed. The district court resolved this issue by refusing to
follow Taylor and Norris, holding that when an order in a prior Chapter
13 case provides prospective relief from the automatic stay, a creditor
need not seek relief from the stay when a subsequent bankruptcy case is
filed." The court reasoned that the debtor was barred from challenging
the prior order granting prospective relief, and that the order was res

28. Id. at 240.
29. See id.
30. See id.
31.

104 B.R. 263 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1989).

32. The order stated that the "[d]ebtor[1 shall be bound by this Order in any conversion of this
Bankruptcy proceeding or in any subsequently filed bankruptcy proceedings of any nature whatsoev-

er, and as to any Automatic Stays issued... and any such future Automatic Stay shall be null and
"' Id. at 264.
33. See id.
34. See id. at 265.
35. See d at 266.

void...
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judicata, holding "[t]here is nothing so sacrosanct about the automatic
stay that it should not be subject to the res judicata effect given to other
types of litigation." 3 Moreover, in response to the debtor's argument
that Taylor barred the court from ordering prospective relief from the
stay, the court noted that while the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate
Panel in Taylor did question whether a bankruptcy court could enter an
order for prospective relief, the issue was never raised in the Taylor trial
court, nor was it argued or briefed before the Bankruptcy Appellate
Panel. Therefore, the court reasoned, "[tihe comment in Taylor [was]
'
dictum and not a determination of this important question."37
Importantly, the Abdul-Hasan court acknowledged that orders for
prospective relief could affect debtors who undergo a positive change in
circumstances after the initial filing because such orders would destroy
the chance for a successful reorganization. However, the court noted that
overcoming an order for prospective relief would only be "a relatively
minor inconvenience"" to a debtor who undergoes a positive change in
circumstances because such a debtor could seek a temporary restraining
order followed by an injunction under 11 U.S.C. § 105."9 The court
reasoned that Congress intended that all presumptions be on the debtor's
side only at the time of the first filing. Once a court determines that a
creditor is entitled to relief from the stay, the burden should shift to the
debtor to show that they are in need of protection. To allow otherwise
would permit the debtor to start afresh as though there had never been
a prior determination, and "[the debtor] only gets one presumption, not
a series of new ones at the cost of $90.00 each. 40
As described above in Part II.A, the court in In re Felberman4'
decided a classic case of abusive serial filing. In Felberman, after the
husband of the debtor filed his third successive Chapter 13 petition on
the eve of foreclosure, the court dismissed his petition with an order for
prospective relief. The debtor failed to appeal the order, and it became
final and binding. 2 Immediately prior to the fourth foreclosure sale, the
debtor's wife fied another Chapter 13 petition. The court held that even
though the debtor's wife was not a party to the earlier bankruptcy filings,
1

36. Id. at 267. See infra Part V for a discussion of the res judicata and collateral estoppel
issues relating to orders for prospective relief.
37. Abdul-Hasan, 104 B.R. at 266.

38. Id. at 267.
39. See infra Part III for a discussion of the powers of the court under section 105.
40. Abdul-Hasan, 104 B.R. at 268.

41. 196 B.R. 678 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995).
42. See id. at 681.
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because of the serial filing situation and the clear unity of interest, the
prior order containing prospective relief was enforceable against her.'
An important distinction between Norris and Taylor on the one hand
and Abdul-Hasan and Felberman on the other is that the orders for
prospective relief in Norris and Taylor were appealed immediately, and
the appellate courts in each of those cases vacated them, reasoning that
a bankruptcy judge lacks the power to enter such an order. In AbdulHasan and Felberman, however, the initial orders for prospective relief
were never appealed, and the issue of their enforceability only arose after
the debtors moved to set aside the creditor's foreclosure sale as violating
the automatic stay arising from the subsequent filing. The distinction
between the two, which will be discussed in Part V, affects the preclusive
effect that should be given to the orders. While the Abdul-Hasan court
upheld the order for prospective relief on the basis of res judicata, Norris
and Taylor were direct appeals that did not raise res judicata or collateral
estoppel issues. The conclusions reached in Norris and Taylor are
questioned in Part I.
Courts have also attempted to address the serial filer problem with
"drop dead" orders. "Drop dead" orders are entered during a Chapter 13
case, rather than upon dismissal as with orders for prospective relief,
which declare that this is the last opportunity for the debtor to restructure
a particular debt or cure defaults.
Such orders typically provide that if the debtor does not succeed in the
Chapter 13 case before the court, either the automatic stay will be lifted
or the case will be dismissed and that such action will be with
prejudice as to the mortgagee or other secured creditor, giving such
creditor potential prospective relief [from the automatic stay] to proceed
with foreclosure, possession or other remedies.'
Thus, "drop dead" orders give a mortgagee prospective relief from the
automatic stay by providing that if the debtor's case is dismissed, the
dismissal will be "with prejudice" as to the mortgagee, who will
therefore not be subject to the automatic stay upon any subsequent filing.
Two examples of cases discussing the enforceability of "drop dead"
orders entered in earlier Chapter 13 cases are Brengettcy v. National
Mortgage Co. (In re Brengettcy)45 and Friend v. Chemical Residential

43. See id. at 684.
44. Friend v. Chemical Residential Mortgage Corp. (In re Friend), 191 B.R. 391, 394 (Bankr.
W.D. Tenn. 1996).
45. 177 B.R. 271 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1995).
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Mortgage Corp. (In re Friend).' The court in each of these cases
refused to enforce the "drop dead" order until the bankruptcy court in the
subsequently filed case could hold a hearing to determine if the debtor
had undergone a change in circumstances since the earlier case to justify
the subsequent filing.
In Brengettcy, during a debtor's first Chapter 13 case, the court
denied the holder of a first mortgage relief from the automatic stay but
included a "drop dead" clause.47 After the debtor's case was dismissed,
the debtor filed another Chapter 13 petition, but the mortgagee nevertheless proceeded with a foreclosure sale. The mortgagee then brought an
action to evict the debtor, and the debtor moved to set aside the sale,
claiming it violated the automatic stay imposed by the subsequent filing.
The mortgagee asserted that the "drop dead" order prospectively relieved
any automatic stay restraints which would prohibit the sale. 8 The court,
however, held that the "drop dead" order, by its own terms, contemplated
that the debtor would be afforded an opportunity to present evidence of
a change in circumstances if she subsequently fied for bankruptcy.4 9
The "drop dead" order granted relief to the mortgagee on the explicit
condition that the debtor could not show a change in circumstances, and
the only way for the debtor to make such a showing was by attending a
hearing. Accordingly, the court reserved decision on the mortgagee's
action to evict the debtor pending a hearing on the change in circumstances issue.
Moreover, even where a "drop dead" order was issued without
provisions for a showing of a change in circumstances, the court in
Friend v. Chemical Residential Mortgage Corp. (In re Friend)" refused
to enforce an order for prospective relief without a hearing. In Friend,
during the debtor's third Chapter 13 case, the court issued a "drop dead"

46. 191 B.R. 391 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1996).
47. The "drop dead" clause provided that "in the event this [petition] is dismissed, then debtor
is prohibited from refiling as to [the mortgagee] unless she is able to show a change in circumstances." Brengettcy, 177 B.RL at 272. It is important to point out that the language of the order is
poorly constructed. Debtors do not file bankruptcy petitions "as to" or "against" particular creditors.
Debtors file petitions in the bankruptcy court to gain an order for relief. See 11 U.S.C. § 301 (1994).
Despite the poor choice of language, the clause has largely the same effect as an order granting
prospective relief since it relieves the mortgagee from the restraints of the automatic stay in any
future case.
48. See Brengettcy, 177 B.R. at 273.
49. Seek.
50. 191 B.RL 391 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1996).
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order." Following dismissal of the case and despite the language of the
order, the court concluded that the automatic stay attached upon the
filing of the debtor's fourth petition. Citing Brengettcy, the court
reasoned that regardless of the language of such an order, section 362(a)
of the Bankruptcy Code makes the automatic stay applicable to all
entities upon the filing of a petition.52 Despite the fact that the "drop
dead" order did not contain any language requiring a change in
circumstances, the court held that "the debtor is entitled to a judicial
determination of whether the debtor had a sufficient change in circumstances to justify a refiling notwithstanding such [a drop dead] order's
entry in a prior case. 5 3 The court further reasoned that to hold otherwise would contradict the policy of providing a good faith analysis of the
totality of the circumstances in each case.' In fairness to the creditor,
who may have relied on the order, the court held that the "drop dead"
order would not be disregarded, but rather, it would be given appropriate
evidentiary weight in the hearing as the court balanced all of the facts
and circumstances.55 Part IV discusses why Brengettcy and Friend
perpetuate the serial filer problem and argues why, as a matter of policy,
orders for prospective relief provide a more equitable and efficient
solution.
I1. 11 U.S.C. § 105-THE POWER OF A BANKRUPTCY COURT TO
ORDER PROSPECTIVE RELIEF FROM THE AUTOMATIC STAY

Although both the district court in In re Norris6 and the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel in Little v. Taylor (In re Taylor) 7 questioned a

51. The order provided that "in the event of the dismissal of [the] case or in the event of relief
from the automatic stay, the dismissal ...would be with prejudice to the debtors' refiling for 180
days as to [the mortgagee]." ld at 393. This order was essentially the same as the order in
Brengettcy, except that it did not contain an exception for a change in circumstances. See Brengettcy,
177 B.R. at 272.
52. See Friend, 191 B.R. at 394 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)).
53. Id. (quoting Norwest Fin. Tenn., Inc. v. Coggins (In re Coggins), 185 B.R. 762, 765
(Banrr. W.D. Tenn. 1995)).
54. See id.; see also Society Nat'l Bank v. Barrett (In re Barrett), 964 F.2d 588, 591 (6th Cir.
1992) (holding that the Circuit's good faith test required an examination of the totality ofthe circumstances).
55. The court suggested that the evidentiary value of a prior order "may place upon the debtor
an increased burden of showing a sufficient change of circumstances to justify a refiling in the face
of such an order." Friend, 191 B.R. at 396.
56. 39 B.R. 85 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984).
57. 77 B.R. 237 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1987), afd in part & rev'd on other grounds, 884 F.2d 478
(9th Cir. 1989).
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bankruptcy judge's power to render the automatic stay unavailable to a
debtor in a future bankruptcy proceeding, neither court considered the
remedies that could be fashioned to prevent abuse under the powers
given to the bankruptcy court pursuant to section 105 of the Bankruptcy
Code.
Section 105 of the Bankruptcy Code58 provides the court with the
authority to exercise a broad range of powers within the administration
of a bankruptcy case that are "necessary or appropriate to carry out the
provisions of this title."59 However, case law has not been uniform in
interpreting the breadth of section 105. Courts have taken either an
expansive view of section 105, arguing that the legislature provided a
broad grant of power so that the bankruptcy court could carry out the
many goals that are implied in the Code's language, 0 or a more
restrictive approach, limiting the court's authority to the clear language
and intent of the Bankruptcy Code.6' Regardless of which approach is
adopted, the power of the bankruptcy court under section 105 is not
limitless; section 105 does not allow the bankruptcy court to override
explicit mandates of other sections of the Bankruptcy Code.62 Under
either approach, however, a bankruptcy court can use section 105 to
order prospective relief from the automatic stay.
Under an expansive reading of section 105, the statute authorizes the
bankruptcy court to issue any order that is "appropriateto carry out the
provisions of [the Code]."' The word "appropriate" could justify a
bankruptcy court's use of section 105 to further the important, although

58. Section 105(a) provides:
The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or
appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title. No provision of this title providing
for the raising of an issue by a party in interest shall be construed to preclude the court
from, sua sponte, taking any action or making any determination necessary or appropriate
to enforce or implement court orders or rules, or to prevent an abuse of process.

11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1994).
59. Id.; see also 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 105.01 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. rev.
1996).
60. See id. 105.01[2].
61. For a more expansive argument claiming that the Bankruptcy Code and recent trends in
case law addressing injunctions, contempt proceedings, and the power over non-debtors favor the

curtailment of section 105 power, see Manuel D, Leal, The Power of the Bankruptcy Court: Section
105,29 S.TEX. L. REV. 487 (1988).

62. See In re Security & Energy Sys., Inc., 62 B.R. 676, 678 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding
that even though the court was granted broad exercise of power under section 105, "those powers
do not allow it to override the explicit mandates of other sections of the Bankruptcy Code [governing

confirmation of a plan under § 1129]"); 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUpTCY, supra note 59,

105.01(2].

63. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (emphasis added).
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implied, goal of preventing debtor abuse of the bankruptcy system. At
least one court has acknowledged that section 105 authorizes an order for
prospective relief to prevent an abuse of process.' In In re Keller, the
district court cited to section 105 in affirming an order entered by the
bankruptcy court containing prospective relief from the automatic stay.
The Keller court held that "[r]epeated filings aimed solely at frustrating
foreclosure through invocation of the automatic stay constitutes bad faith
and an abuse of the bankruptcy process."65 Thus, under an expansive
reading, section 105 empowers a bankruptcy court to issue an order for
prospective relief from the automatic stay, particularly when the court is
confronted by a debtor who has abused the bankruptcy process by filing
multiple petitions.
As the court in In re Earl' stated when it dismissed a debtor's
fourth Chapter 13 case:
The Court must preserve the integrity of the Bankruptcy system
and prevent the abusive use of the Bankruptcy system invoked only to
thwart the legitimate rights of creditors, and preclude an unwarranted
congestion of its docket .... [T]he Court will rely on its equitable
powers under 11 U.S.C. § 105 in fashioning an appropriate remedy
to ... enjoin ... filing another Chapter 13 case for the next six
months. 67
Therefore, if orders for prospective relief are considered an effective and
"appropriate" means of preventing abuse of the Bankruptcy Code, an
expansive reading of section 105 would allow their use.68
While an expansive reading of section 105 interprets the word
"appropriate" to mean that courts can grant orders to carry out the many
implied goals not stated in the Code's language, the restrictive approach
focuses on the precise language of section 105. The statute states that a
bankruptcy court may exercise its power in order to "carry out the
provisions of this title."69 Thus, under a restrictive reading of section
105, an exercise of the bankruptcy court's power must be tied to a

64. See In re Keller, Nos. CIV.A. 96-5730, 96-21025/T, 1996 WL 590877, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Oct.
10, 1996).
65. Id. at *2.

66. 140 B.R. 728 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1992).
67. Id. at 741 (emphasis added).
68. See infra Part IV for the argument regarding why prospective orders for relief are a
reasonable means of preventing abuse.
69. I1 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1994) (emphasis added).
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"provision" of the Bankruptcy Code rather than to a general bankruptcy
policy or objective."
For courts adopting the restrictive approach, the arguments used in
Norris may appear to prevent a bankruptcy court from using section 105

to grant relief from the automatic stay in future proceedings involving the
same debtor. As the court in Norris pointed out, "there is nothing in the
statutory language [of section 362] which purports to enable the
Bankruptcy Court to provide relief from the automatic stay in advance
of the filing of a bankruptcy petition. That is, on its face, the statute
makes the stay automatic in all bankruptcy proceedings."' In addition,
if the reasoning of Norris is applied to the assumption that the automatic

stay is imposed "automatically" by section 362 upon the filing of every
petition, and that there is no other direct authority to support such an
order in the Bankruptcy Code, then it might be argued that a bankruptcy
court should not be able to use section 105 as its source of power to
force a debtor to relinquish the protections afforded by the automatic stay
in the future. However, under a restrictive reading of section 105, a
"provision" of the Bankruptcy Code does exist, which lends the support

necessary to allow a bankruptcy court to order prospective relief from the
70. 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 59, 105.01[2]. The court in Official Committee
ofEquity Security Holders v. Mabey, 832 F.2d 299 (4th Cir. 1987), used the restrictive approach to
curtail section 105 power. Mabey involved the A.H.Robbins Chapter IIbankruptcy case. At issue
was the bankruptcy court's use of section 105(a) to create an emergency fund for tort claimants
suffering damages from the Dalkon Shield. The bankruptcy court's concern about tort claimants
requiring medical attention led to the creation of a fund for those claimants who were in need of
such funds immediately, yet unable to obtain any disbursements prior to the confirmation of a plan,
The Fourth Circuit refused to enforce the creation of the emergency fund, ruling that section
105(a) does not allow the bankruptcy court to grant relief not existing under the Code. The court
stated:
While the equitable powers emanating from § 105(a) are quite important in the general
bankruptcy scheme, and while such powers may encourage courts to be innovative, and
even original, these equitable powers are not a license for a court to disregard the clear
language and meaning of the bankruptcy statute and rules.
Id. at 302. In addition, the court added that "[t]he creation of [a fund] has no authority to support
it in the Bankruptcy Code and violates the clear policy of Chapter I1 reorganizations by allowing
piecemeal, preconfirmation payments to certain unsecured creditors." Id.
However, the ability of a court to use section 105 to order prospective relief from the
automatic stay is different than the attempted use of section 105 by the court in Mabey. In Mabey,
the court refused to allow the use of section 105 to create an emergency fund because it contradicted
the clear language and intent of the Bankruptcy Code, which only permits a distribution to unsecured
creditors pursuant to an approved plan of reorganization under sections 1122-1129. However, the
Code is silent with respect to orders for prospective relief. In fact, as will be discussed, infra, a
specific statutory "provision" exists, section 349(a), which supports restricting the filing of subsequent petitions.
71. In re Norris, 39 B.R. 85, 87 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984) (emphasis added).
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automatic stay. Such support is found under section 349(a) of the
Bankruptcy Code.'

Section 349(a) provides that a case may be dismissed with prejudice
where cause exists, enabling the bankruptcy court to restrict the filings

of subsequent petitions. Many courts have used section 349(a) to dismiss
a debtor's case with prejudice and at the same time enjoin the debtor
from refiling for a limited period of time.' For example, in Stathatos
v. United States Trustee (In re Stathatos),74 the bankruptcy judge dismissed the debtor's third Chapter 13 petition with prejudice so that the

debtor would not be allowed to file another Chapter 13 petition for
twenty-four months. The district court affirmed, holding that under

section 349(a) "the bankruptcy court has discretion to dismiss with
prejudice to the refiling of a subsequent Chapter 13 case."'75

The validity of such orders, however, is not undisputed. In Frieouf
v. United States (In re Frieou),76 the Tenth Circuit held that a bankruptcy court cannot dismiss a case and limit future access to the bankruptcy
court except under the circumstances provided under 11 U.S.C.
§ 109(g).' The Frieoufopinion has received much criticism because of

72. The statute states in pertinent part:
Unless the court, for cause, orders otherwise, the dismissal of a case under this
title does not bar the discharge, in a later case under this title, of debts that were
dischargeable in the case dismissed; nor does the dismissal of a case under this title
prejudice the debtor with regard to the filing of a subsequent petition under this title,
except as provided in section 109(g) of this title.
11 U.S.C. § 349(a) (1994).
73. See, e.g., In re Madison, 184 B.R. 686, 694 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995) (180 days); Stathatos
v. United States Trustee (In re Stathatos), 163 B.R. 83, 88 (Bankr. N. D. Tex. 1993) (twenty-four
months); In re Dyke, 58 B.R. 714, 718 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986) (180 days); Cashman Inv. Corp. v.
Robinson (In re Bradley), 38 B.R. 425, 432 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1984) (six months). Dismissal orders
entered "with prejudice" under 349(a) are different from "drop dead" orders. See supra Part II. A
section 349(a) order contains an outright bar to the debtor's access to the bankruptcy court. "Drop
dead" orders are entered "with prejudice" only to the mortgagee. Thus, "drop dead" orders have
largely the same effect as an order granting prospective relief as they relieve the mortgagee from the
restraints of the automatic stay in any future case, but do not bar the debtor's access from the
bankruptcy court.
74. 163 B.R. 83 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1993).
75. Id. at 87. However, most courts which bar a refiling for a period of time include in the
order an "except with leave of the court'provision. See Dyke, 58 B.R. at 718. With the leave of the
court provision, the debtor is afforded the opportunity to show any change in circumstances which
would justify another filing prior to the expiration of the stated period. See id
76. 938 F.2d 1099 (10th Cir. 1991).
77. See i. at 1102. Section 109(g) states in pertinent part:
No individual ... may be a debtor under this title who has been a debtor in a case
pending under this title at any time in the preceding 180 days if(1) the case was dismissed by the court for willful failure of the debtor to abide
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its interpretation of the second part of section 349(a) which states that a
"dismissal of a case [does not] prejudice the debtor with regard to the
filing of a subsequent petition under this title, except as provided in
section 109(g)." ' Frieoufinterpreted this to mean that courts cannot
limit a debtor's right to refile for a period greater than 180 days because
of section 109(g). The court, however, did not consider the first sentence
of section 349(a) which states, "[u]nless the court, for cause, orders
'
otherwise."79
In other words, the Frieouf court did not permit the
statutory language, "[u]nless the court, for cause, orders otherwise,""
at the beginning of section 349(a) to apply to the statute's second clause
and control the limitations on filing contained in section 109(g)."
Notwithstanding the Frieoufdecision, courts have held that a bar to
refiling for a specific period of time, for cause, may be ordered without
violating section 349(a) or section 109(g).82
Orders which grant a creditor prospective relief from the automatic
stay do not raise a Frieoufissue because they do not deny a debtor's
access to the bankruptcy court. Such orders simply provide that any
future bankruptcy filing by the debtor will not result in the imposition of
the automatic stay as against a particular creditor. More importantly, a
bar to refiling under section 349(a) is a much harsher measure to combat
the serial filer problem than an order for prospective relief from the
automatic stay. A bar under section 349(a) shuts the door to the
bankruptcy court entirely, whereas an order for prospective relief keeps
all of the debtor's other bankruptcy rights intact. Thus, if section 349(a)
can be used to prevent debtor abuse by barring subsequent petitions, a
bankruptcy judge should also be able to use section 105 to prevent serial
filing by ordering prospective relief from the automatic stay. Accordingly, the policies of the restrictive view of section 105, to "carry out the
provisions of this title,"83 would be served by using section 105 to

by orders of the court...; or
(2) the debtor requested and obtained the voluntary dismissal of the case

following the filing of a request for relief from the automatic stay ....
II U.S.C § 109(g)(I)-(2) (1994).
78. 11 U.S.C. § 349(e);see Frieouf,938 F.2dat 1103; see also In reFelberman, 196 B.RL 678,
682 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995) (explaining criticism of Frieou).

79. 11 U.S.C. § 349(a); see Felberman, 196 B.R. at 682.
80.

11 U.S.C. § 349(a).

81. See Felberman, 196 B.R. at 682.
82. See id; Stathatos v. United States Trustee (In re Stathatos), 163 B.R. 83, 87 (Bankr. N.D.
Tex. 1993).
83. 11 U.S.C. § 105 (emphasis added).
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further the provision of section 349(a) to prevent debtor abuse and allow
orders for prospective relief.
IV.

ORDERS FOR PROSPECTIVE RELIEF FROM THE AUTOMATIC STAY
SHOULD BE GRANTED AS A MATTER OF PUBLIC POLICY

Orders for prospective relief from the automatic stay are a
reasonable way for courts to prevent abusive multiple filings and provide
assistance to creditors who have previously litigated the automatic stay
issues.' The practical consequence of such an order is to shift the
burden of proof from the creditor to the debtor. With such orders, the
debtor will not be able to rely on the automatic imposition of the stay to
impose the burden on the creditor to show why the stay should be lifted.
Instead, upon a filing that follows an order containing prospective relief,
the burden falls on the debtor to seek a temporary injunction and a
restraining order along with his new petition in order to prevent a
scheduled foreclosure sale. 5
Part II.B discussed Brengettcy v. National Mortgage Co. (In re
Brengettcy)86 and Friend v. Chemical Residential Mortgage Corp. (In
87 two cases where courts refused to enforce "drop dead"
re Friend),
orders before the bankruptcy court could hold a change in circumstances
hearing. These cases may appear to provide a just result for debtors,
guaranteeing a judicial determination of whether the debtor had a
sufficient change in circumstances to justify a refiling notwithstanding
the prior order. However, mandating a "change in circumstances" hearing
following each filing pursuant to Brengettcy and Friendwill only result
in perpetuating the problem of serial filings. Such a hearing would allow
a serial filer to stall another foreclosure and would largely ignore the
efforts undertaken by creditors in prior proceedings. Where the debtor
does have an honest change in circumstances, an order for prospective
relief would not bar the debtor from protection from the bankruptcy
court8 8 Rather, the burden would be placed on the debtor to prove his
84. See Abdul-Hasan v. Firemen's Fund Mortgage, Inc. (In re Abdul-Hasan), 104 B.R. 263,
267 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1989).
85. Bankruptcy Rule 7001(7) provides that the commencement of an adversary proceeding is
necessary in order "to obtain an injunction or other equitable relief." FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001(7).
Once an adversary proceeding is commenced, Bankruptcy Rule 7065 expressly makes applicable
Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (which governs the granting of preliminary
injunctions and temporary restraining orders). See FED. R. BANKR. P. 7065.
86. 177 B.R. 271 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1995).
87. 191 B.R. 391 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1996).
88. See supra Part III.
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or her new situation by requesting an injunction along with the new
petition."
With a "Friendhearing," following a subsequent filing, the debtor
still would be required to come into bankruptcy court to justify the
refiling in the face of the prior order for prospective relief. However, a
significant burden would remain on creditors who have previously
litigated the automatic stay issues. Friendassumes that all debtors have
the ability to undergo a change in circumstances, yet this assumption
eliminates the deterrence for abusive filers since hearings will be required
in every case, and a significant burden will remain on creditors. Debtors
without a change in circumstances would be able to simply invoke the
protection of the automatic stay and cause more delay, expense, and
docket congestion. In comparison, prior orders with prospective relief
would rest the burden on the shoulders of debtors, who now believe they
are in a better position to reorganize, to make a showing that the
bankruptcy court should provide them with additional protection.
The Brengettcy and Friendholdings may seem fair because they
want to afford the debtor the benefit of the doubt before an order for
prospective relief will be enforced; courts, however, must understand the
hardships imposed on creditors having to deal with serial filers, and
should assume that debtors will not have a change in circumstances so
as to allow for a successful reorganization. Although section 362(a)
provides for the imposition of the automatic stay upon the filing of each
case, the legislature did not intend to bless debtors with a "breathing
spell" for multiple foreclosures, particularly when a bankruptcy court
determined in an earlier proceeding that the debtor has no air left to
breathe."
In addition, orders for prospective relief are important to the overall
system of bankruptcy. When a bankruptcy judge enters an order with
prospective relief from the automatic stay, he or she is making a
judgment about the benefits that a Chapter 13 debtor can gain from the
bankruptcy process. An order preventing the automatic stay from taking
effect in the future allows judges to "sort out," in advance, the bankruptcy rights which will be most costly to the system if the debtor is to file
a subsequent petition and attempt to relitigate the stay. In effect, such
orders maximize an efficient use of the bankruptcy system by making a

89. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
90. See 140 CONG. REc. S4531 (daily ed. Apr. 20, 1994).
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judgment as to the costs and benefits of a future filing.9
Finally, prospective orders for relief provide a reasonable means of
combating the serial filer problem because they deter unjustifiable
refilings, provide protection for creditors who have invested a significant
amount of time and money litigating the automatic stay issues in the
prior proceeding, and minimize the overall costs to the bankruptcy
system. At the same time, such orders are not absolute in that they
provide a procedural opportunity for debtors to make a showing of a
change in circumstances to justify the reimposition of the stay.92
V. RES JuDIcATA AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL-How SHOULD
FUTURE COURTS TREAT PRIOR ORDERS CONTAINING PROSPECTIVE
RELIEF FROM THE AUTOMATIC STAY?
The terms res judicata and collateral estoppel are often confused
when used to describe the effect of a valid, final judgment.93
Under the doctrine of res judicata, a judgment on the merits in a
prior suit bars a second suit involving the same parties or their privies
based on the same cause of action. Under the doctrine of collateral
estoppel, on the other hand, the second action is upon a different cause
of action and the judgment in the prior suit precludes relitigation of
issues actually litigated and necessary to the outcome of the first
action."
Both res judicata and collateral estoppel serve the same general objective:
to "relieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve
judicial resources, and, by preventing inconsistent decisions, encourage
reliance on adjudication."95
Notwithstanding the analysis in Parts III and IV of this Note, even
if orders containing prospective relief from the stay cannot be granted by
judges, a separate question arises as to how these orders should be
treated if the debtor refiles at some later date. This section analyzes
whether orders for prospective relief from the automatic stay should be

91. See Tracht, supra note 1, at 128-37.
92. A prior order that grants prospective relief from the automatic stay may, however,
adversely affect other creditors. For example, if a secured creditor obtained an order granting
prospective relief, junior secured or unsecured creditors taken on by the debtor subsequent to the
initial filing and order may be denied recovery. while this result may be unfair, one could argue that
creditors were on notice of the order and the effects that it could have on the debtor's estate.
93. See 1B JAhMES VM. MOORE ETAL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 1OA05[3] (2d ed. 1996).
94. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n.5 (1979).
95. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980).
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considered res judicata or collateral estoppel in subsequent Chapter 13
cases.
The question posed above was never raised in Norris96 or Taylor 97
because the orders for prospective relief were appealed immediately. In
each of those cases, because the issue was on direct appeal, res judicata
and collateral estoppel were not implicated.
If, however, the orders in Norris and Taylor were not appealed, they

would be res judicata for one important reason: court orders which are
not appealed are entitled to res judicata effect even if they are erroneous
on either the facts or the law.9" As the Fifth Circuit enunciated in
Republic Supply Co. v. Shoaf, "[r]egardless of whether [a] provision is
inconsistent with the bankruptcy laws or within the authority of the
bankruptcy court, [if] it is nonetheless included in the Plan, [and
confirmed without objection or appeal]" the issue is foreclosed from
review under the doctrine of res judicata.9 Therefore, even if the orders
entered in Norrisand Taylor were erroneous, and the judges were correct

about their doubts concerning a bankruptcy judge's authority to order
prospective relief, if the debtor did not appeal the order, it would be
entitled to res judicata.
Indeed, this was the case in Abdul-Hasantt ° and Felberman0 '
where the orders for prospective relief became final. The issue of their

96. In re Norris, 39 B.R. 85 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984).
97. Little v. Taylor (In re Taylor), 77 B.R. 237 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1987), affd in part & rev'd
on othergrounds, 884 F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1989).
98. See Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394 (1981); Republic Supply Co. v.
Shoaf, 815 F.2d 1046, 1049-51 (5th Cir. 1987); 13 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MoORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE 0.40514.-I] (2d ed. 1974); see also Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300,306 (1995)
(holding that an order of the bankruptcy court that is issued on a matter within its jurisdiction and
that does not have "'only a frivolous pretense to validity"' may not be collaterally attacked in
another court (quoting GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 445 U.S. 375,
386 (1980))). Thus, the only avenue available to challenge the propriety of a bankruptcy court order
on a matter within its jurisdiction is to timely appeal it.
99. Republic Supply, 815 F.2d at 1050. In Republic Supply, the bankruptcy court confirmed
a plan of reorganization which released a guaranty for a note that was held by the creditor. See id.
at 1047. The creditor never objected or appealed the entry of the provision in the plan which waived
the creditor's right to collect from the guarantor. Postconflnation, the creditor brought a separate
action in district court to collect under the guaranty, claiming that the bankruptcy court had no power
to release the guaranty. See id. The defendant raised the defense of res judicata claiming that the
confirmation of the plan barred the creditor from enforcing the guaranty. See id. The Fifth Circuit
reversed the district court's decision and held that res judicata barred the creditor from enforcing the
guaranty that was released under the confirmed plan of reorganization. See id.
100. Abdul-Hasan v. Firemen's Fund Mortgage, Inc. (In re Abdul-Hasan), 104 B.R. 263, 267
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1989).
101. In re Felberman, 196 B.R. 678 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995).
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enforceability only arose after the creditors had carried out foreclosure
sales, and the debtors moved to set aside such sales as violating the
automatic stay because of a subsequent filing. °2 As the Abdul-Hasan
court wrote:
Res judicata fills several public purposes, all of which apply in
this situation. It preserves the judicial dispute resolution process against
disrespect from multiple litigation of the same matter or multiple
litigation with inconsistent results, it preserves courts against the
burdens of repetitious litigation, and it provides a means of finality for
ending private disputes. There is nothing so sacrosanct about the
automatic stay that it should not be subject to the res judicata effect
given to other types of litigation."3
Therefore, the failure to appeal an order for prospective relief will be
fatal to a debtor's challenge of the order in a subsequently filed case.
Courts confronting such orders should enforce them on the basis of res
judicata.
The issue of whether orders for prospective relief should be
considered res judicata is different from the enforceability of prior orders
that simply lift the automatic stay but do not contain prospective
relief"°--another closely related issue that courts have addressed when
confronting successive Chapter 13 filings. Some of these courts hold that
because the property and the issues are the same in each case, the
doctrine of collateral estoppel will prevent the stay from being relitigated
in the subsequent action. 5 However, in Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v.
Saylors (In re Saylors),0 5 the Eleventh Circuit indicated that neither res
judicata nor collateral estoppel are applicable in automatic stay litigation.
There, the holder of a first mortgage moved for relief from the automatic
stay after the debtors filed under Chapter 717 The day after such relief

102. See id.; Abdul-Hasan, 104 B.R. at 264.
103. Abdul-Hasan, 104 B. at 267 (citation omitted).
104. See infra note 107.
105. See Abdul-Hasan, 104 B.R. at 266-67; see also In re Taylor, 116 B.R. 728, 730 (Bankr.
E.D. Cal. 1990) (holding that a prior order granting relief from the automatic stay was considered
res judicata in a subsequently filed case). But see Metmor Fin., Inc. v. Debtors & Trustee (In re Cruz
Martinez), 123 B.R. 158, 159 (Bankr. D.P.R. 1991) (holding that a prior order lifting the stay in a
previous Chapter 13 case would not be given res judicata effect in the current Chapter 13 case
because the motion to lift the stay in the current case was predicated on a different section of the
Bankruptcy Code).
106. 869 F.2d 1434 (11th Cir. 1989).
at 1435.
107. See id.
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was granted, the debtors filed another petition under Chapter 13.1°8 The
mortgage holder argued that the prior order lifting the stay in the Chapter
7 case was a final adjudication of his right to foreclose, and that res
judicata and collateral estoppel should bar the debtor, in his current
Chapter 13 case, from challenging that earlier determination."e The
court rejected the mortgagee's argument holding that "[t]he bankruptcy
court's order ... merely lifted the automatic stay in the [debtor's]
Chapter 7 case. In no way did the order purport to be a permanent
adjudication of [the mortgagee's] right to foreclose.""' The court noted
the difference between 11 U.S.C. § 1306 ("Property of the estate' in a
Chapter 13 case) and 11 U.S.C. § 541 ("Property of the bankruptcy
estate") in reasoning that the stay imposed pursuant to section 362(a), by
virtue of the subsequently filed Chapter 13 petition, is "distinct" from the
stay in the Chapter 7 case which preceded it.' Thus, according to the
Saylors court, although the stay litigation involved the same property and
was brought by the same debtor, the property in a subsequently filed
Chapter 13 case is different from the property in an earlier Chapter 7
case, thereby precluding the application of either res judicata or collateral
estoppel."'
The primary difference between a prior order which merely lifts the

108. See id.
109. See id. at 1438.
110. Id.
111. See id.
112. See id. But see In re Rambo, 196 B.R. 181 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1996); In re Darling, 141
B.R. 239 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1992).
The holding of the Saylors court may be supported by distinguishing the two cases through
the policy differences between the automatic stay in Chapter 7 cases and Chapter 13 cases. In
Chapter 13 cases, the automatic stay relieves financial pressures while the debtor seeks to reorganize
under a repayment plan. Under Chapter 7, on the other hand, the automatic stay prevents debtor
harassment while an orderly liquidation of the estate can occur. However, the court's reasoning in
Saylors, which only distinguished between property of the estate defined under section 1306 as
compared to section 541, may be questionable. All of the property included in a bankruptcy estate
pursuant to section 541 is also property of the estate under Chapter 13. See BENJAMIN VEINTRAUB
& ALAN N. RESNICK, BANKRUrCY LAw, MANuAL

9.10 (4th ed. 1996). Section 1306 simply

provides that income earned from the debtor's services after the petition is filed becomes part of the
estate. See I1 U.S.C. § 1306 (1994). The reason for the additional "Property of the estate" provision
under section 1306 is because the debtor in a Chapter 13 case is expected to pay creditors using
income earned after the petition is filed. See WEINrRAUB & RESNICK, supra, 4.03[6]. Thus, the
debtor's property in Saylors is only "distinct" to the extent that the debtor's postpetition income must
now be included in the Chapter 13 estate. However, the debtor's postpetition income was not even
at issue in Saylors. Therefore, because there was no evidence ofpostpetition income from the debtor,
the property was the same, and the application of either res judicata or collateral estoppel should
have been used to enforce the prior order.
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automatic stay and one which adds prospective relief is that with the
latter, the judge has purposefully included such language with the intent
of creating a "permanent adjudication" of the debtor's rights to the
automatic stay as against a particular creditor. Such orders provide a
means of finality for ending a private dispute and serve the same policy
considerations as res judicata or collateral estoppel: enhancing judicial
efficiency by preventing repetitious litigation of the same matter or
multiple litigation with inconsistent results and providing a means of
finality for ending private disputes." 3 Therefore, future courts confronting orders with prospective relief should enforce them by res judicata in
order to prevent the relitigation of the automatic stay against a specific
creditor.
However, despite the strong policies for using res judicata to bar
relitigation of the automatic stay issues, one important exception to the
doctrine of res judicata exists: no judgment can affect subsequently
arising rights and duties."' This exception is particularly relevant when
debtors have had a material change in circumstances since their initial
filing and could justify the imposition of a new stay."5 If a debtor has
a material change in circumstances, creating the possibility of a
successful reorganization, such a change should be considered a new
right to utilize the bankruptcy system."6 Even if all of the elements of
res judicata or collateral estoppel were present to bar a debtor from
challenging a prior order, a material change in circumstances should
nevertheless allow the debtor to gain the protection of the automatic stay.
However, the use of this exception does not mean that orders with
prospective relief cannot still be considered res judicata in subsequently
filed cases. As discussed in Part IV of this Note, the problem of debtors
with a change in circumstances can be addressed by using section 105 to
invoke a temporary injunction or restraining order in place of the

113. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90,94 (1980); Abdul-Hasan v. Firemen's Fund Mortgage,
Inc. (In re Abdul-Hasan), 104 B.R. 263, 267 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1989) (citing 18 CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTnCE AND PROCEDURE § 4403 (1981)).
114. See 1B JAhMS WM. MOoRE ET AL.,supra note 93, 0.415 n.16 (citing 2 FREEMAN ON
JUDGhMENTS §§ 712-716 (1925)).

115. See Cashman Inv. Corp. v. Robinson (In re Bradley), 38 B.R. 425,432 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.
1984) (holding that the problem of multiple filings should be dealt with as a problem of resjudicata,
and that prior decisions granting creditor relief from the automatic stay should be considered

conclusive and res judicata where the debtor has not had a change in circumstances to justify
invoking a new stay).
116. Due to the extreme effect that res judicata can have on someone with a change in
circumstances, some courts give no res judicata effect after there has been a material change in
circumstances. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Duel, 324 U.S. 154, 161 (1945).
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automatic stay. Therefore, courts should use res judicata to protect
creditors from the abuses of debtors who refile without a change in
circumstances, and where such a change has occurred, debtors should not
be barred from receiving the protection of an injunction in the subsequent
action.
VI.

CONCLUSION

For several years, bankruptcy courts have been faced with the
problem of fashioning a form of relief from the automatic stay that will
protect creditors from abuse of the bankruptcy laws by debtors acting in
bad faith. Orders granting prospective relief from the automatic stay are
a balanced solution to the problem of serial filing. While the first courts
to address the enforceability of these orders doubted the authority to
enter such an order, there are sound statutory arguments and good policy
reasons to provide the basis for bankruptcy judges to grant them. Until
Congress decides to address the problem and amend the Bankruptcy
Code, orders for prospective relief from the automatic stay can and
should be granted to address the serial filer problem.
Spencer Zane Baretz"
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